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It has been frequently quoted in the literature that one decisive cause of the productive 
performance of an economy might be infrastructure investment. This paper provides a dual 
profit theoretical framework of measuring the effects of infrastructure on economic 
performance in terms of gains in profits, cost savings, as well as in terms of productivity 
growth enhancement. In an empirical application, we opt for Mexican industry data. The 
results show that returns to infrastructure capital are significant and positive, though some 
variability across time exists. Moreover, the decomposition of total factor productivity growth 
reveals that the economic performance could be enhanced by investing in infrastructure 
capital. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Measuring productivity growth has always been central in discussions regarding the development of 
an  economy  (Barro,  1989,  Shah,  1992,  Morrison  and  Schwartz,  1994).  But  what  we  imply  by 
productivity growth, Jorgenson (1997) defines productivity growth as “the part of output growth that 
can  not  be  explained  by  an  increase  in  the  use  of  inputs”.  Moreover,  productivity  growth  is 
attributed to improvements in technology, scale effects and an increase in the efficiency of resource 
use  (see  Capalbo  and  Antle,  1988).  However,  given  the  complexities  involved  in  accurately 
measuring productivity growth it is not surprising that much controversy has been generated around 
this issue.   
 
A  rather  neglected  determinant  of  productivity  growth  for  a  prolonged  period  of  time  is 
infrastructure,  though  its  importance  has  been  unequivocal.  The  spark  of  recent  research  papers 
could be traced to Aschauer (1989) following the early work of Meade (1952). Ashauer’s paper 
argued  that  public  infrastructure  explained  some  of  the  productivity  growth  slowdown  in  US 
economy  in  the  late  seventies  and  it  triggered  a  plethora  of  papers  thereafter  (for  a  review  see 
Gramlich, 1994 and Vijverberg et al., 1997). Despite the evidence provided by Aschauer (1989) and 
Munnel (1992), some research provided estimates of an insignificant return to public infrastructure 
in US (Evans and Karras, 1994 and Holtz-Eakin, 1994). Moreover, the high output elasticities of 
infrastructure reported by Aschauer (1989) and Munnel (1992) raised criticism on issues such as the 
lack of flexibility of their underlying production function specification, the aggregation bias in the 
macroeconomic data sets used, and the possible endogeneity of output (see Vijverberg et al. (1997)).   3 
Using duality theory, Nadiri and Mamouneas (1994) and Morrisson and Schwartz (1996) addressed 
some of these issues to find that public infrastructure was enhancing productivity in US.  
 
A country in which the role of public infrastructure may be seen as particularly influential is Mexico, 
in light also of the fact that public investment in infrastructure fell from 12% in the early eighties to 
bellow 5% in the nineties, at a period that growth of output in parallel dramatically declined and 
major macroeconomic instabilities occurred. This trend is not unique as it has been observed to other 
OECD  countries  (see  Sturm,  1998),  though  in  case  of  Mexico  becomes  even  more  apparent  as 
productivity  growth  severely  deteriorated  over  the  years.  This  parallel  development  of  low 
infrastructure  investment  and  sluggish  growth  could  indicate  some  correlation  between  the  two, 
hence the numerous studies investigating the returns to public infrastructure (see Gramlich, 1994 and 
Vijverberg et al., 1997).  
 
Of  course,  other  factors  could  be  held  accountable  for  the  observed  underperformance  of  the 
Mexican economy. In particular in the nineties, the economy faced a major financial crisis that led to 
severe macroeconomic imbalances, which coupled with rising world uncertainties posed by high 
volatility in oil prices and high interest rates curbed economic activity. Another factor could be the 
globalization that appears to have stressed the economy triggered by the intensified competition of 
low labour cost countries, such as China (see OECD, 2003 a). However, globalization should not be 
seen as posing threats to the economy. Indeed in the case of Mexico, globalization could have been 
beneficial  if  producers  and  policy  makers  alike  had  swiftly  responded  towards  restructuring 
traditional  labour  intensive  production  procedures  and  adopting  the  necessary  policy  reforms,  in   4 
particular in labour markets (see Bergoeing et al. 2002). Moreover, the low skilled manufacturing 
sector of Mexico is difficult to compete against China or with other low income countries, including 
in Central America. Based on data reported in the IMD World Competitiveness Yearbook (2004) the 
hourly compensation in the manufacturing sector in Mexico is $2.45 compared to $0.66 in China.  
 
Besides the idiosyncratic characteristics of the Mexican economy and the uncertainties linked to the 
external economic environment, OECD (2005) emphasizes the importance of infrastructure. This 
emphasis is based on the recent literature of productivity growth that widely, yet not universally, 
argues that infrastructure investment could contribute to total factor productivity (TFP), regardless of 
the  technical  change  and  the  returns  to  scale  (Gelauff  et  al.  2004).  However,  few  studies  have 
attempted to measure this return in the case of Mexican economy, though Shah (1992), Feltestain 
and Ha (1995) and Feltestein and Shah (1995) report that indeed public infrastructure investment is a 
productive input.   
 
The theoretical framework of this paper complements studies that use duality theory (see Vijverberg 
et al., 1997) as it also opts for a flexible functional form, and therefore it departs from the primal 
analysis proposed by Aschauer (1989). Moreover, we derive a solution to the profit maximization 
problem  that  a  firm  is  facing.  The  choice  of  profit  function  is  based  on  the  earlier  research  of 
Vijverberg et al. (1997), arguing that the profit function approach, in general, performs better than 
either the production function or cost function approach. The profit function provides additional 
flexibility as the hypothesis of the exogeneity of output, found within a cost function framework, is 
relaxed  and  the  supply  function  is  considered  endogenous  (see  Shah,  1992).    In  turn,  this 
optimization provides a theoretical framework that allows the identification of profit gains due to   5 
public  infrastructure,  as  well  as  it  allows  measuring  the  effects  of  infrastructure  on  total  factor 
productivity.  In  addition,  this  framework  provides  also  measurement  of  the  cost  savings  due  to 
infrastructure.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows; section 2 presents the theoretical framework of 
the  profit  function,  while  section  3  discusses  the  data  set.  Section  4  provides  the  empirical 
specification,  the  estimation  procedure,  and  the  empirical  findings,  whereas  the  last  section 
highlights some concluding remarks and economic policy implications derived from the empirical 
findings. 
 
2. A theoretical specification of profit function 
 
Consider the following production function, where X, G, t denotes production inputs, public 
infrastructure, and technological change respectively.  
 
Y = f(X, G, t)                                          (1) 
 
The firm’s objective is to maximise profits given the production function (1) and it can be written as: 
 
ππ(P,w, G, t) = 
X
max  [P f(X, G, t)-w X]         (2) 
 
, where P is the output price, w is as nx1 vector of the price of private inputs. The profit function is 
strictly convex in P and w.  
  
By applying the envelope theorem we get:   6 
 
ππG(P, w, G, t) = P fG(X, G, t)              (3) 
 
ππt(P, w, G, t) = P ft  (X, G, t)                        (4) 
 
, where subscripts denote first partial derivatives. 
 
Equation (3) shows that the profit marginal shadow value of public infrastructure equals the marginal 
product value of public infrastructure, while equation (4) the profit marginal shadow value of 
technology as depicted by a time trend equals its marginal product value. 
 
Similarly, the above optimisation could be expressed in terms of maximising the difference between 
total revenues and the cost of producing the output level Y.  
 
πc (P,w, G, t) =
w
max  [P Y – C(w, Y, G, t)]   (5) 
This profit function is convex and linear homogenous in P and w.  
We apply envelope theorem in equation (5) and obtain: 
 
πcG (P, w,G, t) = -CG (w, Y, G, t)             (6) 
 
πct (P,w, G, t) = - Ct (w, Y, G, t)               (7) 
   7 
Equation (6) shows that the marginal shadow value of public infrastructure as measured by the profit 
function is equal to the negative of the marginal shadow value of public infrastructure as measured 
from the cost function, C. Similarly, equation (7) describes the effect of the technological change.  
 
2.1 Profit gains due to public infrastructure  
Next, we use the above theoretical specification to quantify the effects of public infrastructure on 
economic performance. In the case that infrastructure capital is indeed a productive input, then it 
would induce profit gains. To measure these profit gains we start our analysis by total differentiating 
the profit function of equation (2): 
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, where dots above the variables denote percentage growth rates. 
 
The effect of public infrastructure on profit is derived as the difference between the total derivative 
of the profit function of equation (8) and the weighted average of the growth rates of output price 
and input prices:  
ηπG =  ) , ( ) , , , (
. . .
w P t G w P ξ π −                                         (9) 
, where ξ is a function of the growth rate of P and w. For practical reasons ξ is taken as the weighted 
average of the growth rates of output price and input prices with weights being the elasticities of the 
profit function with respect to P and w (see Ray and Segerson, 1990 and Fousekis and Pantzios, 
2000). Thus, we derive:   8 
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Combining equation (10) with (8) we get: 
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+          (11)  
In effect the ηπG  measures the impact of public infrastructure and technological change on profit 
over time. 
 
2.2 Cost savings due to public infrastructure 
Similarly,  in  a  parallel  exercise  the  cost  saving  impact  of  public  infrastructure  is  derived  as  in 
Morrison and Schwartz (1994) by total differentiating the cost function C(w, Y, G, t) in equation (5) 
that gives: 
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The effect of public infrastructure on cost is derived as the difference between the total derivative of 
the cost function of equation (12) and the weighted average of the growth rates of input prices:  
ηCG =  ) ( ) , , , (
. .
w t G Y w C θ −                                         (13) 
 
, where θ is a function of the growth rate of w.    9 
 
For practical reasons θ is taken as the weighted growth rates of input prices with weights being the 
elasticities of the cost function with respect to w. Thus, we derive: 
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Next, by combining equation (14) with (12) we get: 
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σ , the cost elasticity with respect to output. 
 
Given the assumption of cost minimization, the equation (15) decomposes the cost savings into the 
scale effect, the effect of public infrastructure, and the technical change effect.  
 
However, notice that the growth rate of output in equation (15) is affected by price changes as well 
as by public infrastructure and technology changes. This is due to the underlying profit maximization 
theoretical  specification  of  the  present  analysis.  Therefore,  output  is  endogenous  and  we  should 
remove any effect stemming of changes in prices. To this end, equation (15) should include an 
adjusted supply net of changes in prices. 
   10
To derive the adjusted output we take the total derivative of the supply function, Y = f (P, w, G, t)
1:  
 
) , , , (
.
t G w P Υ =
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , (
) , , , ( . . .
t G w P Y
t G w P Y
G
t G w P Y
G t G w P Y
w
t G w P Y
w t G w P Y
P
t G w P Y
P t G w P Y t G
i
i wi P
+ + Σ +       (16) 
 
The adjusted growth rate of output is the difference between equation (16) and the weighted average 
of the growth rates of output price and input prices, with weights being the elasticities of the output 
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, where subscript α counts for the adjusted profit maximized growth of output. 
 
By combining (16) and (17) we get: 
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, that is the corrected growth rate of output net of changes in prices.
2 
Thus, the adjusted cost savings are: 
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1 Note that the supply function is given as Y= f(X, G, t), while X = X (P, w, G, t) as it is determined by the optimization 
of Π. Then, the supply function becomes Y= f(P, w, G, t). 
2 This adjustment is necessary so as to isolate, and therefore be able to identify, the  supply side impact of public 
infrastructure. Thus, any demand side effects are purged of.    11
 
The cost saving rate in equation (19) is decomposed into: (a) the scale effect induced by the response 
of production to changes both in public infrastructure and technology, (b) the direct cost impact of 
public infrastructure, that is the contribution of public infrastructure to the firm’s cost savings over 
time holding production constant, and (c) the dual technical change effect.    
  
Now, by substituting equations (6) and (7) into (19), multiplying and dividing the last two terms on 










, where R is total 
revenue, we get the cost savings due to scale effects, public infrastructure, and technology: 
ηCGα = σ
.
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2.3 The impact of public infrastructure on productivity growth  
Next we derive the impact of public infrastructure on total factor productivity. As in Vijverbeg et al. 
(1997) given production function (1) the decomposition of total factor productivity is:  
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The first term is the product of the output elasticity with respect to public infrastructure, which is the 
primal rate of return to public infrastructure, and the growth rate of public infrastructure. The second 
term is the primal rate of technical change. Note that if the growth rate of infrastructure is zero or the   12
output elasticity with respect to infrastructure is zero then equation (21) reduces to the traditional 
Sollow’s residual measure of total factor productivity.  
 
Now, substituting (3) and (4) into (21), and multiplying and dividing the right hand side of (21) by 
profit we get:  
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Equation (23) shows that the total factor productivity depends on the scale economies,
σ
1
1− , and the 
profit  impact  of  public  infrastructure  and  of  technological  change.  Low  economies  of  scale  in 
parallel with small profit impact of public infrastructure and technological change would result to 
low levels of productivity growth. 
 
3. The Mexican economy and the Data set  
The case of Mexico is of some interest as investment in core public infrastructure, defined as capital 
stock in electricity, transport and communication, has been one of the lowest among OECD countries 
(see  OECD  Economic  Outlook,  2002).  OECD  (2005)  argues  that  there  has  been  a  chronic 
underinvestment of infrastructure investment caused mainly by the lack of fiscal consolidation and 
prioritisation of public expenditure towards investment rather than consumption expenditure. One of 
the latest episodes of heavy curtailment in infrastructure investment took place during the financial   13
crisis in the mid-1990s followed by fiscal consolidation efforts that heavily relied on reducing public 
investment  expenditures.  In  addition,  public  investment  projects  were  crucially  dependent  on 
changes in oil revenue and thus subject to the high volatility of oil markets. In a parallel process, and 
despite the economic recovery in the second half of the nineties brought by the fiscal consolidation, 
the productivity growth followed a declining path. Over the sample period, the growth of Mexican 
total factor productivity (TFP thereafter) relative to the growth in US TFP followed a downward 
trend, falling from 1.21% in 1970, 1.17 in 1980, 0.8% in 1990, to all time low 0.67% in 1995, while 
partly recovering thereafter to reach 0.74% in 2000 (see OECD, 2003 a). Evidently, the average rate 
of Mexican TFP growth lagged behind US TFP growth since early in the 1980s, underlining the 
magnitude of the Mexican economy’s task of converging to the living standards of its northern 
neighbour. 
An answer to this underperformance could be found in the low levels of infrastructure investment, 
despite the investment boom of the late 1990s as it largely focused on building consumption related 
facilities,  such  as  shopping  malls  and  fast  food  chains,  rather  than  enhancing  the  production 
capabilities  of  the  economy.  Based  on  the  country  economic  review  of  OECD  (2003  a),  the 
inadequate public investment has created shortages in core infrastructure such as communications, 
transportation, electricity, sanitation and water.
3 In addition, the business climate in Mexico has not 
been at all supportive to private investment due to heavy regulations and legislative restrictions, 
which is all more striking as these are part of the institutional infrastructure that also appears to be 
rather inadequate to enhance potential growth.  
                                                            
3According to OECD Environmental Performance Review (2003b) in Mexico the water and waste water sector would 
require $2.2 billion of investment funds, twice the annual budget of the National Water Commission (CNA), which is 
responsible for producing and regulating water.   14












































































































    Source: OECD 2005, Economic Outlook. 
 
In turn, an inadequate provision of infrastructure deters further investment and acts as an impediment 
to business (Feltestain and Ha, 1995). In particular, weakness in transportation and communication 
infrastructure prevents Mexico from getting the most out of its proximity to the US.  Besides the 
strategic location of Mexico, fixed investment as percent of GDP in Mexico takes low values if 
compared  to  other  OECD  countries.  The  investment  ratio  averaged  merely  20%  in  the  latest 
expansion phase during the period 1996-2001, including residential construction and investment by 
large state-owned companies. This ratio is lower than its level in the early eighties or in previous 
decades, and it is quite low compared to the OECD average (see Diagram 1). It is worth mentioning 
that following the extensive privatization operations of the early 1990s, the public sector share of 
investment declined. However, and despite the significant share of private investment, the private   15
sector  has  appeared  not  willing  to  cover  the  shortage  of  infrastructure  created  by  the  public 
underinvestment as it has mainly directed resources to the commercial sector. In addition, there is 
also evidence of inadequate quality of investment (OECD, 2005).  
 
The  above  descriptive  analysis  poses  a  question  regarding  the  importance  of  infrastructure 
investment. To answer this question, we next provide an empirical application concerning Mexican 
industries over the period 1970-2000. The data set is mainly derived from the Annual Industrial 
Survey (AIS) from the Mexican Institute for Statistics, Geography and Informatics (INEGI), which 
provides adequate information regarding: output measured as value added, that is net of intermediate 
inputs,  employment  measured  as  number  of  employees,  wages,  investment,  capital  stocks,  and 
expenditures in electricity, communications, and transport.  
 
The  focus  on  micro  data  allows  employing  some  disaggregation  into  our  empirical  application 
justifying  the  theoretical  specification  of  the  present  analysis  that  focus  on  the  firm’s  profit 
optimization and thus departs from a demand side analysis.
4 In detail, the following ten Mexican 
two-digit industries are included in our sample: mining, food, beverages & tobacco, wood and wood 
products, paper, chemicals, plastics & rubber, metal products, machinery & equipment, construction. 
 
Time series for infrastructure and industry capital stocks is constructed using series for total Gross 
Fixed  Capital  Formation  (GFCF)  and  investment.  The  capital  stock  series  for  both  totals  and 
disaggregated  components  were  built  up  via  a  Perpetual  Inventory  Method  (PIM)  applied  to  a 
                                                            
4 It is worth noting that a demand side analysis is warranted at an aggregate macroeconomic as in Aschauer (1999) or a 
general  equilibrium  framework  and  it  would  have,  therefore,  assisted  the  identification  of  the  impact  of  public 
infrastructure. However, such an analysis is beyond the scope of the present study that relies on profit optimization and 
industry data.   16
benchmark capital stock for the year 1970, which is the standard OECD method. A PIM adds GFCF 
to benchmark capital and subtracts the depreciated capital in each year. The depreciation pattern can 
be linear or non linear. We used a linear depreciation pattern, which is the normal choice when 
information about actual depreciation is not available (see Albala-Bertrand, 2003). The benchmark 
for total capital stock was based on Hofman (2000 a, b). The proportion of core infrastructure of the 
total  stock  is  based  on  the  methodology  proposed  by  Arellano  and  Braun  (1999).  In  turn,  the 
proportion  of  infrastructure  components  of  total  infrastructure  was  based  on  actual  investment 
patterns. The depreciation rates used were the ones suggested in these sources. The price indexes 
used to deflate the nominal series came mostly from the GDP deflator, but we also used PPI and CPI 
as deflators when the former were unavailable.   These series were available from the National 
Income and Product Accoutns (NIPA) of the Banco de Mexico. All series are expressed in constant 
1993 pesos.  
 
4. Empirical model 
To estimate the effects of infrastructure capital on productivity and on the production structure of 
Mexican industries, we specify a restricted translog profit function: 
 







































γit lnwit  + γpt lnPt + 
γGt lnGt                                                                                                                     (24)                                                       
 
Applying Hotelling’s Lemma to equation (24), we obtain the following equations for the shares of 
profit attributed to output, inputs, and infrastructure:   17
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i iG w ln β  + βpGlnP  +γGtt                                             (27) 
 
Equation  (27)  is  of  our  interest  as  it  shows  the  shadow  share  of  public  infrastructure,  and  is 
considered as a measure of the return to public infrastructure.  
  
The monotonicity condition on the profit function requires that it is, respectively, non decreasing and 
non increasing in prices of output and inputs and is non decreasing in infrastructure capital. At the 
point of approximation, equations (25)-(26) imply that the profit shares of output and inputs are, 
respectively, positive and negative. Sufficient conditions for these inequalities are that βp≥0, βt≥0, 
and  αi  ≤0,  for  all  i,  respectively.  We  impose  linear  homogeneity  restrictions  on  profit  function 























γip =0.  We also impose the symmetry condition αij=aji. In addition, convexity with 
respect to price is tested in terms of the positive semi definiteness of the Hessian matrix of second- 
order partial derivatives of the restricted profit function. Also, the profit function needs to be concave 
with respect to the quasi fixed capital infrastructure stock, so that the Hessian matrix of the profit 
function should be negative semi-definite with respect to this stock. 
 
4.1 Empirical results 
The system of equations (24) - (26) is estimated with iterative SUR to account for contemporaneous 
correlations of error terms. In the estimation, we exclude the private capital’s profit share equation to   18
avoid singularity of the variance co-variance matrix.  Also, in order to estimate the parameters of the 
profit function equation we pooled the inter industry time series data. By doing so we deal with the 
problem of multicolinearity frequently associated with data of a single industry. The interindustry 
data set provides the necessary variability, and therefore allows a more rigorous statistically analysis 
of the parameter estimates and the correspondent elasticities.
5  
 
As a way to capture these interindustry differences we introduce dummy variables on the constant 
term of the profit function for each industry. We have assumed that α0s = α0 + ∑
s
s sD 0 α , where Ds 
refers to the industry dummies taking values 1 and 0, s is the industry identification index, and the αjs 
are normalised with respect to  the k industry (αjk = 0).  
 
Parameter estimates of the profit function are reported in Table 1. Overall, the results suggest that the 
estimated translog profit function is well behaved, as the signs on the  coefficients of the profit 
function  are  reported  to  be  consistent  with  curvature  conditions,  while  the  magnitudes  of  the 
estimated elasticities are plausible and statistically significant for most industries.  
 
Moreover, the fitted profit function satisfies the motonicity property at all data points as the output 
shares are found to be positive and the variable input shares negative, while the profit shares of 
infrastructure capital is  estimated to be positive. Also the Hessian matrix reports that the profit 
function is convex in prices and concave in infrastructure capital.  
                                                            
5 Given that our data set has time series dimension, in addition to the cross section dimension across industries, it could 
be the case that there exist unit-roots and stochastic trends. Preliminary tests show that the despite some non-stationary 
variables into our sample the residuals from the estimated equations were found to be stationary indicating the existence 
of long-run relationships in terms of cointegration (results are available under request).    19
 
Table 1: parameter estimates of translog profit function. 
parameter  estimated value                                 t-stat 
αK   -1.17  -2.05* 
αL  -0.14       -8.03**       
βP  0.28       3.83**      
βPP  0.01       2.56*      
βG  0.22       3.80**      
γLG  0.001    0.154       
γPK  0.067   0.758 
γPL  0.070        5.48**       
βPP  -.0109       -2.56*      
αKL  -1.155       -1.35      
αKΚ  -0.007   -6.80**      
βt  0.779       4.34**      
βtt  0.001  1.232    
βGG  0.26        2.88* 
γtP  0.23  4.22** 
γtL  0.61    0.81 
γtG 
Sourcee 
-0.019        -2.01* 
D95  -0.18       -4.108**      
     
R
2-profit                          0.975    
R
2-output                          0.986    
R
2-labour                          0.966    
Source: Author’s estimations, ** statistically significant at 1% level, while * at 5% level. 
Note that the previous section discusses a major macroeconomic instability caused by financial crisis 
in the mid-1990s that could potentially bias our empirical estimation of the system of equations. To 
take into account this event, we include a dummy-variable for the year of pesos crisis, 1995, in the 
translog profit function specification. The dummy variable is found to be significant and carries a 
negative sign, insinuating the detrimental effect the pesos crisis on the profitability of the Mexican 
industry.  
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Diagram 2 presents the elasticity of profit with respect to public infrastructure. It is positive across 
all sample points. This finding implies that public infrastructure asserts a positive externality to the 
Mexican industry. However, note that it follows a negative trend till mid nineties, whereas in 1995 
the financial crisis led to major macroeconomic instability that resulted to a negative spill over effect 
on the return to public infrastructure as measured by the elasticity of profits with respect to public 
infrastructure.  
 



























4.2 Profit gains, cost savings, TFP contribution of public infrastructure  
The profit gains of public infrastructure depend crucially on the elasticity of profits with respect to 
public  infrastructure,  but  also  the  actual  growth  rate  of  public  infrastructure  (see  equation  11). 
Despite  the  promising  above  6.5%  average  growth  in  infrastructure  investment  in  the  1970s, 
investment followed a negative trend from the early 1980s until the crash in 1995 due to the financial 
crisis. Moreover, the average growth rate of infrastructure capital, which was slightly above 2.5% in 
the 1980s, less than half of the growth rate in the 1970s, dropped to -1.65% in the 1995. A recovery   21
in infrastructure investment is reported in the second half of the 1990s, reaching an average 5%, as 
the outcome of an improvement in the general economic climate.  
 
Table 2 presents the contribution of public infrastructure to profit as derived from equation (11), 
augmented with the technical change effect, over the sample period 1970-2000. The results show 
that the effect of infrastructure is positive in all years (see 3
rd column in Table 2). The average value 
of the profit gains over the period due to infrastructure is around 1.14%. The technical change, 4
th 
column  in  Table  2,  is  also  positive  every  year  but  1995,  insinuating  that  technical  change  was 
progressive with an average value of 1.1%. However, in contrast with the impact of infrastructure, 
the contribution of technology, though declines over time, it exhibits a stable contribution to profit 
gains compared to public infrastructure. Note that in the 1970s, the impact of public infrastructure 
was higher than 2.0%, and higher than the impact of technical change. Alas, it rapidly diminished in 
the  1980s  and  1990s  as  investment  in  infrastructure  investment  was  fainting  away  during  a 
prolonged period of economic instability. As a result, and despite the significant magnitude of profit 
gains due to infrastructure and technology in the 1970s, over time the ηπG exhibits a clear downward 
trend.  
 
TABLE 2, estimate of rate of gains in profit due to infrastructure 
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1970-75  0.33  6.99  2.32  1.36  3.68 
1975-80  0.31  6.40  1.96  1.17  3.13 
1980-85  0.24  5.58  1.33  1.14  2.47 
1985-90  0.21  2.62  0.55  0.93  1.48 
1990-95  0.18  1.30  0.24  0.92  1.16 
1995-00  0.22  2.01  0.45  1.21  1.66 
1970-00  0.25  4.15  1.14  1.12  2.26   22
 
The average ηπG during the period 1970-80 is around 3.3%, whereas considerable decline is observed 
in the 1980s, followed by a sharp decline thereafter reaching an all time low at around 1.1% in the 
first half of the 1990s.  This development is explained by both the decline in the profit elasticity with 
respect to public infrastructure but also by the downward trend observed in the growth rate of public 
infrastructure  since  the  mid  1980s.  In  particular,  due  to  the  dramatic  collapse  of  infrastructure 
investment in the 1990s the profit gains due to infrastructure lacked persistently behind the profit 
gains due to technology, halving the value of ηπG compared to the 1970s.  
 
Table 3 presents the cost savings due to scale effects (1
st column), infrastructure capital (2
nd column) 
and technology (3
rd column). The average cost saving due to infrastructure is -0.25% over the sample 
period, though it steadily declines over time to reach its lowest value in the period 1991-95 of -
0.02% from around -0.31% during the 1980s and -0.4% in the 1970s,  confirming the findings of the 
profit gains. Moreover, given that the scale and the technological effect remain relatively stable over 
the sample period, despite some observed decline in the 1990s, it is the infrastructure effect that 
determines the magnitude of cost savings. Note, that during the period of financial crisis in 1991-95, 
ηCGα takes a positive value of 0.01%. This result implies that the Mexican industry faced negative 
externalities that raise costs, mainly due to the underinvestment in public infrastructure, while some 
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ηCGα 
1970-75  1.19  -0.47  -1.05  -0.33 
1976-80  1.17  -0.36  -1.05  -0.24 
1981-85  1.20  -0.31  -1.04  -0.15 
1986-90  1.23  -0.27  -1.05  -0.09 
1991-95  0.97  -0.02  -0.94  0.01 
1996-00  0.90  -0.05  -0.87  -0.02 
1970-00  1.11  -0.25  -1.00  -0.14 
 
 
In a recent study, Cole et al (2005) show that Latin America in general has been less productive than 
main industrialised economies with the average TFP levels in Mexico corresponded to roughly 50% 
of US productivity between 1950 and 2000. There are many arguments put forward as possible 
explanations for this trend among others; macroeconomic instability due to widespread governmental 
economic intervention, corruption, income inequality, and lack of competition due to monopolies 
and  barriers  to  entry  (see  Cole  et  al,  2005).  Equation  (23)  provides  a  specification  of  TFP 
decomposition into the direct impact of public infrastructure and the primal rate of technical change 
so as to investigate whether these two factors could explain the decline of TFP over the years.  
 
Table 4 reports the dramatic decline of TFP in manufacturing that more than halved over the sample 
period from above 2.8% in the 1970s to around 1.26% in the 1990s. The low level of TFP in the 
1990s is also demonstrated by Lopez-Cordova (2003). Moreover, as in the case of ηπG and ηCGα, the 
contribution of public infrastructure to TFP exhibits a downward trend. The average contribution of 
the effect of public infrastructure on TFP growth is slightly above 1.0%, but it falls from around   24
1.8% in the 1970s to 1.2% in 1981-85, to 0.62 in 1986-90, and, then, further declines to 0.25% in the 
period 1991-95, recording some recovery thereafter. As a result, the observed decline in TFP is 
mainly due to the sharp drop in infrastructure investment in the second half of the 1980s and the 
1990s that resulted to shortages in infrastructure capital in line with the discussion of OECD (2005).  
Note, that the contribution of technological change remains stable over the sample period, further 
emphasizing that the driving source behind the sluggish economic performance of Mexican industry 
since the mid 1980s is the low infrastructure investment.  
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1970-75  1.87  1.1  2.97 
1976-80  1.78  1.06  2.84 
1981-85  1.23  1.05  2.28 
1986-90  0.62  1.05  1.67 
1991-95  0.25  0.97  1.22 
1996-00  0.31  0.98  1.29 






This  paper  develops  a  theoretical  framework  based  on  a  flexible  profit  function  that  allows 
measuring  the  returns  of  public  infrastructure  in  terms  of  higher  (lower)  profits  (costs).  It  also 
provides  a  theoretical  specification  of  TFP  decomposition.  The  empirical  estimates  show  that 
infrastructure capital is a productive input for the Mexican industry, as it generates profit gains and 
cost savings, though over time its impact declines. In addition, the TFP decomposition demonstrates 
that  infrastructure  investment  could  be  responsible  for  the  observed  slow  down  in  economic   25
performance  since  the  mid  eighties.  This  finding  suggests  that  productivity  growth  cannot  be 
attributed to technical change and scale economies alone.  
   
In most respects, Mexico’s economic performance improved since the financial crisis of the mid 
1990s.  However,  Mexico’s  productivity  growth  performance,  despite  the  efforts  to  achieve 
macroeconomic stability, has been rather unsatisfactory.  Our estimates of TFP show a clear negative 
trend over time and in particular in the 1990s, that have act as an impediment to potential growth. 
Indeed, OECD (2005) revised downwards the potential GDP growth estimates to below 4%. This 
performance does not assist attempts to narrow the gap in living standards with the other OECD 
countries, and it can not be judged as satisfactory for a country with large income disparities and 
high rates of population growth. The present empirical findings shed some light to what is often 
characterized as one of the pathogenic causes of the low economic performance of the Mexican 
economy; that is the chronic shortage in infrastructure capital in roads, electricity system, water 
supply and water treatment. In terms of economic policy, the findings emphasize the necessity to 
address this shortage, also in line with the recent policy guidelines of OECD (2005). 
 
However, an issue that the current paper has not tackled, and it is of importance, concerns the issue 
of raising the appropriate financial resources to build infrastructure. OECD (2005) argues that in 
Mexico “the fiscal revenues under the existing tax system are insufficient to finance infrastructure 
spending by federal, state and local governments at an adequate level”. In addition, it is more than 
often the case that fiscal consolidation efforts weigh much on the public investment rather than on 
the public consumption expenditures. As a result, building up the much needed infrastructure capital   26
should also necessarily involve the private sector, while prioritizing public expenditure away from 
consumption expenditure and into infrastructure investment projects could also play a positive role.    27
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